USAF's Dark Clouds... and a Silver Lining

Both of you frequent readers know I’ve been saddened and chagrined by the negative press the Air Force has been getting in the last year or so, and a lot of that bad press was brought on by the Air Force itself. Things like mismanaging a multi-billion dollar tanker procurement, unknowingly flying “live” nuclear cruise missiles under the wings of a B-52 from North Dakota to Louisiana, and nuclear surety issues in Europe, all of which contributed to the recent firings of SecAF and USAF’s Chief of Staff. USAF is truly beginning to look like “The Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight” if you believe everything you read, and most of what you read in this space is fact, not opinion. But USAF is doing some things right.

Enter Mike Dunn, President and CEO of the Air Force Association (and a retired USAF three-star). In a relatively short piece published by the AFA yesterday, Mr. Dunn takes on the Air Force’s critics. His lede:

When a company doesn’t meet its earning numbers, it is popular to look at management for someone to blame. Over the last few weeks numerous articles and editorials have been featured in the press about the “downfall” of the US Air Force – a Service besotted with so-called systemic, cultural, leadership, ... and even moral problems. The way this story line goes is the writer bundles every perceived “wrong-doing” – often over many years – into a big package and applauds DOD leadership for firing the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff. (“Everything” being tanker selection process, nuclear issues, lack of focus on today’s war, “next war-it is,” the number of UAVs deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, officer pilots versus enlisted pilots, etc. Some media even add in the tanker lease contract, proselytizing at the Air Force Academy, sexual assaults at USAFA, and a host of others). Usually the author throws so much mud on the wall, it is difficult to refute much of what is said … and trying to point out the many inaccuracies only brings more attention to pieces which have titles like: “Clean up the Air Force.” Also, most publications limit responses to 100 words or less. And with so many items to refute, it is impossible to do so.

What follows is a point-by-point refutation of some of the criticisms leveled at the Air Force…not all, but some. Two key accusations cited in almost every negative article I’ve read lately concerns the availability of UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ever-popular whipping-boy, F-22 procurement. First, on UAVs:

Third, the supposed AF bias against UAVs is often cited as why the AF is not paying attention. Again, the facts don’t bear this out. It is important to remember that it was the AF which embraced the Predator … this after the Army refused to field it. It was the AF which modified it to add anti-icing capability so it could fly in the winter over Bosnia, the AF which modified it to carry Hellfire missiles; the AF which designed and built the distribution system to ensure the intelligence got to the warfighter; the AF which repeatedly called for increased production and a second line. Every Chief of Staff in the last 10 years has sought increased numbers of UAVs – and it was the AF which fielded both the Global Hawk and the Reaper. The AF has 88% of its UAVs deployed to the AOR … this as opposed to the Army, whose Ops concept is to organically assign them to its fighting units – only 30% of which are deployed. And … the AF has beat the DOD requirement for 21 CAPs. They now have 23 CAPs – two years ahead of schedule. [For more see: http://www.afa.org/EdOp/edop_5-6-08.asp]

And about the F-22:

Fourth, is the AF’s strong advocacy of the F-22. This is true. The Service believes that the tasks given to it by DOD requires this advanced technology. We’re heard lots about why the AF should stop buying F-22s, but nothing about DOD changing its defense strategy to reflect a different threat set in the future. In fact, an attempt to do so was non-concurred by every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [see: http://www.afa.org/GatesApproves.pdf]. Moreover the critics often cite the expense of the F-22 and compare the performance of the F-35 favorably against it. Both are factually inaccurate. The F-22 flyaway cost is about $130M and it has a much better capability than the F-35. The more relevant question is what is the cost of all the conventional systems required to penetrate denied airspace to accomplish what one F-22 can accomplish? The answer is the F-22 is a bargain in that regard. Most critics don’t know it has an air-to-ground and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. Likewise most don’t realize the F-35 costs are likely to grow. [For a short tutorial on why we need the F-22, see the film at this site: http://www.afa.org/MPEG/Air_Supremacy.asp]. Secretary Gates says the AF has not even deployed the F-22 to Iraq with the implication that we don’t need it. The fact is that the theater commander has requested the F-22, the AF has agreed, and the Secretary has refused to send it forward … reportedly for fear of scaring Iran, but more likely because if he did approve that request, the value of the F-22 would become very obvious, validating the demand for the F-22. Further, this “test” of whether a weapon system is worthy is a false one. There are lots of systems which are not deployed in Iraq … e.g. nuclear subs, P-3s, ICBMs, etc etc. It is clear that the F-22 is needed for the future, and if we stop building it, we will wished we had not … much like we did when DOD made the AF stop buying the B-2. (Ed: links left as found)

There’s more at the original link in my second paragraph, above. There’s some stuff in Mr. Dunn’s piece I didn’t know, and I’m fairly well informed about things USAF (for a guy over 20 years removed from active duty, that is). Mr. Dunn points out that there are good things going on in the Air Force right now and the Air Force is indeed carrying its weight, perhaps more than its weight, in the nation’s current wars.

Even though “things” may not be as bad as they seem, my take-away from Mr. Dunn’s article is that the power struggles in the Pentagon are very intense at the moment, and are likely to get much MORE intense as time moves on. Perhaps not as intense as the Revolt of the Admirals, but pretty danged close. Except this time the shoe is on the other foot, and it ain’t all about one particular weapons system. There are serious “roles and missions” discussions going on right now in the Pentagon and amongst our most senior civilian leaders. These discussions will affect the shape and structure of our forces for the next 20 years and beyond. The Air Force’s most senior leaders need to make their case, both within and outside of the Department of Defense, for the importance and relevance of airpower in our present and future conflicts. I think Mr. Dunn’s piece is a good start.